> I don't know of intelligent design proponents who deny creationism, that's interesting.
I don't know if any intelligent design proponents deny creationism in all its forms. They hardly can, since what they are proposing is itself a form of creationism. But many try to obscure the fact that it is a form of creationism.
> what the original poster has said isn't necessarily intelligent design theory. They seem to have in mind the fine-tuning argument, roughly speaking that the order/structure of the universe suggests that the universe was designed
It's the same argument, though. Whether it's a "beautiful statue," as in the post I replied to here, or a watch, or a blood-clotting mechanism, or "the order/structure of the universe," the argument is "this thing was clearly designed, therefore the God that I profess to believe in is real."
Doesn't matter whether you call it "intelligent design" or "fine-tuning" or whatever, it's all the same: this thing was "designed," therefore there is/was a "designer" who intentionally created it. It's all creationism.
This is all sort of an aside from my main point to the post I replied to, which is that by equating the fact that he "feels" there is a God with "feeling" hungry, he is using the words "feel" and "feeling" very sloppily at best, and conflating two very different things in a way that confuses rather than clarifies.
Certainly, there are those who use this kind of sloppy language exactly because it confuses rather than clarifies. He may just be a victim of one, possibly many times removed, or he may be one himself. I dunno.
Yes, in the sense that they point towards a creator of the universe. But intelligent design theory is more readily dismissed as anti-scientific nonsense, while the fine-tuning argument is not.
Since your original reply to the original poster was that "none of these reasons are reasons", and you went on to say, re: the design argument, nothing more than "this is a creationist argument", the implication seemed to be that an argument being a creationist one is reason enough to dismiss it. If you were just making a comment that the argument was expressing a belief that the universe was created (creationism), that seems fairly obvious, and I don't have anything to quibble about.
I would not agree that the fine-tuning argument "point[s] towards a creator." As I understand it, it is that if various natural constants had values other than those we observe, either life as we know it, or even the universe itself, could not exist. Nothing about a creator.
Certainly, there are those, seemingly including you, who would like to use it to "point towards a creator," but I think that in general, they want to point in that direction regardless, and will hang their hats on whatever comes along that seems like it might get them where they want to go.
>As I understand it, it is that if various natural constants had values other than those we observe, either life as we know it, or even the universe itself, could not exist.
This is just a fact, no?
The fine-tuning argument is something like, Premise (1) this fact is true, and it must be because of chance, necessity, or design. Premise (2) it is not by chance or necessity. Conclusion: it is by design.
You can reject the premises (probably premise 2), but it's a valid (even if unsound) argument whose conclusion points towards a creator. And its rejection probably warrants some explanation rather than an out-of-hand dismissal.
Good lord. Your (2) is entirely unfounded and can absolutely be rejected with no further explanation than that. All you have is (1), from which no conclusion can be drawn.
Again, nothing about (1) itself "points towards a creator." You just seem to wish that it did.
At first glance (2) seems plausible, no? Given that there's an apparently narrow range in which certain universal/cosmological constants lie, outside of which life (possibly the universe itself in the way we know it) would be impossible, it seems that that these constants are what they are is a very low probability event. And in the same way that we would probably say a coin that turns up heads a thousand times in a row isn't by chance (we would probably have no trouble saying it's by design in this case, that is, the coin has been rigged), it seems plausible to say the Goldilocks state of affairs isn't by chance. And it seems that the state of affairs could have been other than what they are, so it seems that it's not by necessity. So it's not obvious that we can reject (2) out of hand.
There is, I think, a good case to be made against (2)---for example, an appeal to the anthropic principle, or an appeal to multiverse theory. But this is far from a rejection with no further explanation.
But saying that the constants are what they are not being a very low probability event isn't pure speculation? Saying that the state of affairs can only possibly be what they are isn't pure speculation?
>unhelpful analogy
Maybe so, but I don't see why it's not fruitful to spell out why this analogy is unhelpful.
>Given that it is entirely unfounded, I would say that we not only can, but should.
Does it not warrant an explanation for why things are by chance, or why things are by necessity? An explanation for why things being by chance or necessity is founded? Otherwise, (2) appears intuitive, I can conceive that the gravitational constant could have been something other than what it is, and since I can imagine it, it seems that things could have been this way, and there should be an explanation why they are not. Now, maybe it's the case that conceivability isn't the same as possibility, but I think that warrants being addressed. Or maybe it's that there is an explanation, e.g. that if the constant wasn't what it is, we wouldn't be around to talk about it. But again, I think that warrants being spelled out.
>I think that you just want to get to a particular conclusion and will postulate whatever it takes to get there.
Maybe so, but I think if someone postulates something intuitive but false, regardless of their motivations, it's better to address why it's false instead of shutting down discussion.
> Does it not warrant an explanation for why things are by chance, or why things are by necessity?
Sure .. and here physics has no necessity for a purposeful creator.
Of all the multitudes of parallel universes that can come into existence .. the only ones that have any observers who can comment on what a long shot it is to be in a universe with observers are those universes that have the dice rolled just right for such observers to exist.
The existence of billion dollar lottery winners is not proof of the existence of god, it's strong evidence that multiple lotteries with many entrants exist.
Yes, right, exactly, this is the kind of explanation that I've been saying is warranted spelling out. And there's a lot to discuss here - what does it even mean for a multitude of parallel universes to exist? why should we believe that's something that's possible? how does it work exactly? what are the implications of such a theory? is there any rigorous science we can do to flesh out how this works? and other questions. And people have written a lot on this topic.
> saying that the constants are what they are not being a very low probability event isn't pure speculation?
I am not suggesting that that is the case. You are speculating here, I am not.
> I don't see why it's not fruitful to spell out why this analogy is unhelpful.
Not the way it works. Your analogy, your burden.
> Does it not warrant an explanation for why things are by chance, or why things are by necessity? An explanation for why things being by chance or necessity is founded?
I am not speculating that either of those is or is not the case.
You speculate because it gets you to the conclusion that you clearly want. I have no such need.
> I think if someone postulates something intuitive
Your speculation is not actually "intuitive." You describe it that way only because it is to your liking.
> but false, regardless of their motivations, it's better to address why it's false instead of shutting down discussion.
Depends on the discussion. As for this one, I will decline to continue it further.
I don't know if any intelligent design proponents deny creationism in all its forms. They hardly can, since what they are proposing is itself a form of creationism. But many try to obscure the fact that it is a form of creationism.
> what the original poster has said isn't necessarily intelligent design theory. They seem to have in mind the fine-tuning argument, roughly speaking that the order/structure of the universe suggests that the universe was designed
It's the same argument, though. Whether it's a "beautiful statue," as in the post I replied to here, or a watch, or a blood-clotting mechanism, or "the order/structure of the universe," the argument is "this thing was clearly designed, therefore the God that I profess to believe in is real."
Doesn't matter whether you call it "intelligent design" or "fine-tuning" or whatever, it's all the same: this thing was "designed," therefore there is/was a "designer" who intentionally created it. It's all creationism.
This is all sort of an aside from my main point to the post I replied to, which is that by equating the fact that he "feels" there is a God with "feeling" hungry, he is using the words "feel" and "feeling" very sloppily at best, and conflating two very different things in a way that confuses rather than clarifies.
Certainly, there are those who use this kind of sloppy language exactly because it confuses rather than clarifies. He may just be a victim of one, possibly many times removed, or he may be one himself. I dunno.