Sure. But I'm not denying the reality of instinct. What I'm denying is that instinct is normative. What is natural is not necessarily what is good or what we ought to do.
>You keep bringing up words and facts. Reality is more than words.
Sure. This "what should I do today" story isn't some linguistic sleight of hand. I told that story to evoke the intuition that there's a difference between instincts and values.
It's really just that the claim that reproduction is our purpose appears unfounded. The argument seems to be something like:
P1: The process of evolution has sculpted human biology for reproduction.
P2: If human biology has been sculpted for reproduction, then we ought to reproduce.
C: We ought to reproduce.
P2 is simply unfounded - it just doesn't appear to be true. Perhaps what you're saying is something like "You're just playing a word game here. Saying that we are sculpted to reproduce is the same as saying that we ought to reproduce---these phrases have the same meaning." But these phrases don't have the same meaning. There are facts, and then there are values, and these aren't the same thing---not just linguistically, they really, in reality, are not the same thing.
And suppose they are the same thing. So our purpose is to reproduce. Does this even mean anything in practice? I take it you believe your purpose is to reproduce. Why is it that you've typed text into a combox and hit "reply"? That doesn't seem conducive to reproduction. It's not just this comment; I suspect that many things, if not the majority of things you do, don't seem conducive to optimizing reproduction. Why would you do these things if they're not helping your purpose?
Perhaps you'd say that "Well, it might not immediately seem like these things are conducive to reproduction, but there's a long story I can tell about how these actually are related to my reproductive drive." But if you start playing these kinds of games, it isn't clear that "our purpose is to reproduce" really means anything in practice at all. You can always construct some story about how your behavior is, through some long chain of reasoning, reducible to a reproductive drive. That still leaves us with the practical question of what our purpose is - what should we actually do? "To reproduce" just isn't helpful.
> What is natural is not necessarily what is good or what we ought to do.
We are so abstracted from our underlying nature with cultural proxies that it is hard to think of what is natural. Also, I never said choice does not exist; prescriptions are not commands.
> There are facts, and then there are values, and these aren't the same thing---not just linguistically, they really, in reality, are not the same thing.
Right, and your biology communicates to you in values alone, because facts are tools for communication.
> P2: If human biology has been sculpted for reproduction, then we ought to reproduce.
That is redundant; the prescription is done unconsciously and without reasoning, so reasoning can always make it seem absurd. If we are built to reproduce then we should expect to feel satisfied when we do so. Mammalian reproduction is far more complex than that though, and human reproduction is the most complex.
> Why would you do these things if they're not helping your purpose?
To me that's like asking why we are consciousness. I don't know. I guess somewhere along the line we became so complex that we managed to hijack our biology. We can focus on short-term pleasure instead of balancing things with long-term satisfaction. I am talking to you out of curiosity.
> That still leaves us with the practical question of what our purpose is - what should we actually do? "To reproduce" just isn't helpful.
I would say that people ask about the meaning of life or their purpose because they have been alienated from their underlying biology. If someone feels satisfied, they won't ask about meaning.
OK - let me clarify the language I've been using. (For brevity, I may speak a bit loosely with certain technical philosophical ideas here, but I'll try to avoid jargon for the most part.) I'm going to spill a good amount of ink here, but that's not because I'm trying very hard to trick you with meaningless words, but on the contrary, I'm trying to spell out very carefully what I'm saying to make it clear that what I'm saying is meaningful, even if you disagree (just like the statement "The earth is flat" is meaningful, though false. But it's not a word game.)
"1+1=2". "The earth is round." "I am sitting on a chair right now." These are all truths.
Truths come in different categories. For example, some truths are mathematical truths. Some truths are truths about the physical world.
Some truths are truths (as opposed to falsities, like "1+1=3") by virtue of other truths being truths. For example, "the internal angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees" is a truth in virtue of Euclid's fifth postulate ("if a line segment intersects two straight lines forming two interior angles on the same side that are less than two right angles, then the two lines, if extended indefinitely, meet on that side on which the angles sum to less than two right angles") being a truth. If the latter is a truth, then it must be the case that the former is the truth.
Physical truths are not truths purely by virtue of mathematical truths alone. For example, no amount of mathematical truths grounds the truth that there is an inverse square law describing the force between physical objects. This is why Newton had to make observations about the world to formulate the inverse square law---because the inverse square law is true by virtue not purely of mathematical truths.
You may or may not have contentions at this point with what I've said - put that aside as long as you understand what I'm trying to illustrate - some truths are truths by virtue of other truths, and there are, in principle, some categories of truths such that no truth of one category can be a truth in virtue because of a truth of another category (you can at least understand what I'm saying about physical truths and mathematical truths, even if you have contentions about whether this is actually the case). And this isn't a language game, what I'm saying really does have meaning.
OK - now consider "One ought not murder an innocent person without just cause". This is a truth. This is not merely a bunch of words strung together in a grammatically correct way like "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously". This sentence is an expression of a truth.
Moreover, this is not the same the truth "I believe one ought not murder an innocent person without just cause". This is a truth about my psychological state, expressing something completely different. "One ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" is a truth regardless of whether or not "I believe one ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" is a truth. It is also a truth regardless of whether or not "Most people believe one ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" is a truth. To equate these truths would be to misunderstand what "One ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" means. Just like how "1+1=2" is a truth that is not the same as "I believe 1+1=2". These are completely different. "1+1=2" is a truth regardless of what my belief about it is. Even if I had some strange drive that might somehow be related to reproduction to want to claim "it is not true that 1+1=2", that would have zero bearing on "1+1=2" being a truth. To believe otherwise would be to misunderstand what "1+1=2" means, it's not a truth having to do with my beliefs, desires, motives, psychology, or biology. It is a mathematical truth, which is completely independent from all that. "One ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" is a truth in a very similar way.
In general, ought-truths are not truths by virtue of is-truths alone (of course, ought-truths can be truths of is-truths in conjunction with ought-truths. For example, "I ought not murder Socrates" is a truth by virtue of "Socrates is an innocent person" (is-truth) and "I ought not murder an innocent person" (ought-truth). However, "I ought not murder Socrates" is not a truth by virtue of "Socrates is an innocent person" alone.)
The same applies to the truth "Evolution has sculpted humans for reproduction". This is an is-truth. "I ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" cannot be a truth by virtue of this truth alone. To think that it could would be to misunderstand what "I ought not murder an innocent person without just cause" means. It is not a truth about psychology, biology, history, mathematics, etc. It is a moral truth, and such truths exist independently of truths about the beliefs people have, the psychological states people are in, or biological drives that people have.
Now, you might object that there is no such thing as an ought-truth---"I ought not murder an innocent person" is just the same thing as saying "I believe I ought not murder an innocent person" or "Most believe I ought not murder an innocent person" or "I have bad feelings about murdering innocent people" or something like this. That's fine---but then we're talking about completely different when we talk about "purpose". Purpose in the sense that it is an ought-truth is what I am talking about. I'm not talking about truths about human biology. Those truths are irrelevant---well, not really irrelevant (like I said, ought-truths aren't truths by virtue of is-truths alone, but they can be truths by virtue of is-truths and ought-truths, so there may be relevant is-truths to our purpose), but they are not the whole story.
And to be sure, thus far, when I have been talking about "facts", what I meant was "is-truths", and when I have been talking about "values", what I meant was "ought-truths".
>I don't know. I guess somewhere along the line we became so complex that we managed to hijack our biology. We can focus on short-term pleasure instead of balancing things with long-term satisfaction. I am talking to you out of curiosity.
So this is a good point to respond to that would help clarify what exactly I mean by purpose. Your response here would be very confusing if you meant purpose in the sense that I meant it. It would be as if you said "My destination is the grocery store," and I asked you, "If your destination is the grocery store, why are you walking toward the zoo?", and you said, "I don't know. I'm curious about what's going on at the zoo." Your response here indicates that your destination isn't in fact the grocery store, or at least, "My destination is the grocery store" is not the whole story, it's actually "My first stop is the zoo, and my final destination is the grocery store," or something like this. To believe otherwise would be to misunderstand what "My destination is the grocery store" means. Now of course, a valid response could have been "My destination is the grocery store, but I got distracted." - having a purpose doesn't preclude a weakness of will causing you to take actions not conducive towards that purpose. But you said "I don't know".
And this isn't some weird meaning I've arbitrarily ascribed to the word purpose. No, purpose in this sense is what actually matters. It is not a description of the way in which a bunch of physical stuff is organized.
For some further intuition on this, it might be fruitful to reread my example of murder in a previous comment in this light. Even if it really were the case that murder was natural, that would have no bearing on its immorality. I'm sure you can come up with other examples where what is natural is immoral.
> Now, you might object that there is no such thing as an ought-truth---"I ought not murder an innocent person" is just the same thing as saying "I believe I ought not murder an innocent person" or "Most believe I ought not murder an innocent person" or "I have bad feelings about murdering innocent people" or something like this. That's fine---but then we're talking about completely different when we talk about "purpose".
Statements of oughts are values not truths. I'm not sure how you've come to the idea that an ought can be a truth.
> Your response here indicates that your destination isn't in fact the grocery store, or at least, "My destination is the grocery store" is not the whole story, it's actually "My first stop is the zoo, and my final destination is the grocery store," or something like this. To believe otherwise would be to misunderstand what "My destination is the grocery store" means.
Tradition is a highly complicated system of values; a lot of values have been made indirect and abstracted far away from our instincts. I think you've constructed an analogy that doesn't really bear any useful resemblance to reality, because it's hard to see how going to the zoo can help me go to the grocery store. I can see how my curiosity leads me to being creative and learning, which are both helpful in the tradition I belong in.
> Purpose in the sense that it is an ought-truth is what I am talking about. I'm not talking about truths about human biology. Those truths are irrelevant---well, not really irrelevant (like I said, ought-truths aren't truths by virtue of is-truths alone, but they can be truths by virtue of is-truths and ought-truths, so there may be relevant is-truths to our purpose), but they are not the whole story.
> And this isn't some weird meaning I've arbitrarily ascribed to the word purpose. No, purpose in this sense is what actually matters. It is not a description of the way in which a bunch of physical stuff is organized.
You keep referring to the truth of reproduction, whereas I am talking about feeling purpose in it. Purpose is validated by the meaning that is gained from it.
> For some further intuition on this, it might be fruitful to reread my example of murder in a previous comment in this light. Even if it really were the case that murder was natural, that would have no bearing on its immorality. I'm sure you can come up with other examples where what is natural is immoral.
Killing is natural. Murder is an immoral act due to the traditional set of values that we have inherited. We react to killing instinctively, but we react to murder because it violates the traditional order. If the traditional order is warped so that people are no longer connected to it, you will see the inner animal emerge from them. If anything natural is deemed immoral, it is from the standpoint of the traditional order.
I think values (in this context) are truths! It's an idea that seems strange at first, and I think that if you asked people on the street, they would probably say indeed that ought-statements aren't objectively true, just matters of opinion or something like that. But I think this is wrong.
But to be sure, what I've been saying is that the claim that "We ought to reproduce as our primary purpose" is true is incorrect. If you don't think ought a statements are truths, then there's actually no disagreement here, you don't think it's true either.
But I think ought-statements can be true. "Spinach is yucky" is a kind of statement that isn't a truth and isn't really true or false---it's just a matter of opinion. But I think that this is fundamentally different from, for example, "The earth revolves around the sun". The latter case is independent of what people believe or what kind of feelings they have about the roundness of the earth---not so for the first case. Now consider " We ought not hold slaves." Is this statement more like "Spinach is yucky" or "The earth revolves around the sun"? There was a time where most people would have disagreed with "We ought not hold slaves". They would have even said it's traditional, it's economically necessary, etc. But all that has no bearing on this statement. Slavery is wrong and has always been wrong - even when it was traditional, when most people held slaves, etc. Because morals aren't just claims about what's traditional or conducive to reproduction. Just like "the earth revolves around the sun", tradition and evolution and psychology don't affect the truth of this statement---it is simply true.
> I think that if you asked people on the street, they would probably say indeed that ought-statements aren't objectively true, just matters of opinion or something like that.
Not that it really matters, but if you asked people in philosophy departments, they would say the same.
> But to be sure, what I've been saying is that the claim that "We ought to reproduce as our primary purpose" is true is incorrect. If you don't think ought a statements are truths, then there's actually no disagreement here, you don't think it's true either.
Since it's a value, it's either right or wrong. You've decided that "reproduction is necessary and sufficient for a meaningful life" is wrong.
> Now consider " We ought not hold slaves." Is this statement more like "Spinach is yucky" or "The earth revolves around the sun"?
It is in the same category as the former; it is a statement of value.
> Slavery is wrong and has always been wrong - even when it was traditional, when most people held slaves, etc. Because morals aren't just claims about what's traditional or conducive to reproduction. Just like "the earth revolves around the sun", tradition and evolution and psychology don't affect the truth of this statement---it is simply true.
I doubt it. I don't want to open up a can of worms, but I have no problem forcing people who have committed heinous crimes to work for nothing; my only problem is that I think such a system may not be implemented properly. Also, I don't have a problem with people not being able to profit from publicising their crimes. I think the only problem I have with the government seizing assets from criminals is that government officials abuse their power.
The majority of the surveyed subscribe to moral realism (though there are no doubt biases in the demographic of those surveyed, and of course, the language used in descriptions of meta-ethical theories is more technical than "objectively true" or not). But as you said, that's neither here nor there.
>Since it's a value, it's either right or wrong. You've decided that "reproduction is necessary and sufficient for a meaningful life" is wrong.
But what this means for you is, apparently, just that you have positive feelings towards reproduction, and for me to disagree with you is not to reject some clear, objective indication of my purpose as if I've rejected a claim like "the earth is round"---it's actually more like you've told me "spinach is yucky" and I've said "No, I quite like spinach".
>It is in the same category as the former; it is a statement of value.
I don't think so and I don't think you treat such statements like the statements of the former either---
>but I have no problem forcing people who have committed heinous crimes to work for nothing
Sure, fine, I'm talking about holding people who are innocent as slaves, a practice which has been seen as morally permissible at various times and places. Those who thought that it was morally permissible were, in fact, wrong to think so---just as those who thought "the sun revolves around the earth" was a true statement were wrong to think so.
You see my point even if you disagree, right? The point is that there are times, places, cultures where people have done immoral things. That they are a product of evolution or tradition or whatever is besides the point to the immorality of what they've done. I am happy to be born in a society that values not holding (innocent) slaves. Just like I'm happy to be born in a society that understands the earth revolves around the sun. But it would be nonsensical for me to say that I'm happy to be born thinking "Spinach is yucky" because being born otherwise would lead me to believe in the "false" claim "Spinach is not yucky"---that doesn't make any sense, because the yuckiness of spinach isn't some objective property of spinach, and if I liked spinach, then spinach wouldn't be yucky, because a claim like "Spinach is yucky" is no more than an expression of my personal distaste for it. That I have a strong intuition that "slavery is wrong" is more like "the earth revolves around the sun" as opposed to "spinach is yucky" is evidence that moral claims aren't in fact just matters of personal taste. The immorality of holding innocent slaves isn't, prima facie, like the yuckiness of spinach---we certainly don't have the same attitudes towards them.
> The majority of the surveyed subscribe to moral realism (though there are no doubt biases in the demographic of those surveyed, and of course, the language used in descriptions of meta-ethical theories is more technical than "objectively true" or not).
Yeah, I didn't have American universities in mind.
> But what this means for you is, apparently, just that you have positive feelings towards reproduction, and for me to disagree with you is not to reject some clear, objective indication of my purpose as if I've rejected a claim like "the earth is round"---it's actually more like you've told me "spinach is yucky" and I've said "No, I quite like spinach".
I can't see how eating spinach or not has any real effect on society. Some values are more important than others, and some are even more important than facts. When you said, 'Doesn't the "rigorous approach to seeking/knowing truth" seem kind of detached from the reality of life to you?', you seem to be placing values over facts. That doesn't make values factual though.
> I don't think so and I don't think you treat such statements like the statements of the former either---
Well it is a moral judgement, so I treat it more seriously than an aesthetic judgement, but they are both rooted in values all the same.
> Sure, fine, I'm talking about holding people who are innocent as slaves, a practice which has been seen as morally permissible at various times and places. Those who thought that it was morally permissible were, in fact, wrong to think so---just as those who thought "the sun revolves around the earth" was a true statement were wrong to think so.
They're wrong from a modern standpoint. The problem is that morals are like fashions; they are subject to change, and by that I mean, the weight that we place on different values is always changing. If freedom is the highest value, then slavery is the worst crime, or something like that. The problem is that we're not at the end of history; we are not the final judges of the world, and the people that come after us will see the world differently. I don't want to be so cynical to say that morals are simple tools that we use to reach our own ends; I think humans are better than that. I think morality is dependent on having faith in the people that have come before us. You may not think we are still dependent on their valuations, but I think we are.
> You see my point even if you disagree, right? The point is that there are times, places, cultures where people have done immoral things. That they are a product of evolution or tradition or whatever is besides the point to the immorality of what they've done.
They appear wrong from our current standpoint. You cannot scientifically demonstrate that slavery is wrong though. Even pain itself is hard for scientists to measure. We have faith in our intuitions, and it's good that we do, but I can't see how they are factual no matter how confident we are in them.
>I can't see how eating spinach or not has any real effect on society. Some values are more important than others, and some are even more important than facts. When you said, 'Doesn't the "rigorous approach to seeking/knowing truth" seem kind of detached from the reality of life to you?', you seem to be placing values over facts. That doesn't make values factual though.
Sure, my point wasn't that the yuckiness of spinach and the purpose of life were equally important issues, but that on the view that oughts are simply matters of opinion, that my rejections of the claims "spinach is yucky" and "our purpose is to reproduce" are equally valid---I've simply disagreed with an opinion of yours. This is very different from me rejecting a claim like "The earth is round". And I think, with claims like the latter, it makes sense for a rational discussion to be had about whether or not such a claim is right. But with claims like "spinach is yucky", there's surely nothing to be discussed---I like spinach and you don't, end of story. But I think you sense that the purpose of life isn't this kind of claim; otherwise it wouldn't make sense to try to rationally discuss this claim.
So I suppose I'm struggling a bit to understand your case---you think the question of purpose is just a matter of opinion, but at the same time, our purpose is clearly to reproduce? Is this not just your personal opinion, on your view? Perhaps you're saying that, as a matter of fact, that everyone will find fulfillment in reproducing? But even this isn't true, there are plenty of celibates who find fulfillment in their way of life. Maybe just that most people will find fulfillment in reproducing? Maybe so, though there's clearly a lot of things other than reproducing that people find fulfilling---science, religion, mathematics, art, music, sports, and so on. Maybe that an unconscious reproductive drive undergirds the desire to engage in such activities even if they are not immediately related to reproduction directly? OK - maybe so, but if all of human behavior is undergirded by a reproductive drive, "our clear purpose is to reproduce" doesn't actually tell us anything about what to do, since anything that we do would be distantly related to a reproductive drive, and we're back to square one.
(Of course, that's all putting aside that that all says nothing about what our true, objective purpose really is.)
>They're wrong from a modern standpoint. The problem is that morals are like fashions; they are subject to change, and by that I mean, the weight that we place on different values is always changing.
>They appear wrong from our current standpoint.
I don't see how the fact that beliefs about morals have varied across time/space/culture means morality must be subjective any more than the fact that beliefs about scientifically discoverable facts have varied across time/space/culture means that scientifically discoverable facts must be subjective. It doesn't matter that there are some people who defend the earth being flat today. It doesn't matter that people used to believe the sun revolved around the earth. These things don't make beliefs about the shape of the earth or the relationship between the earth and the sun fashions in the sense that there's no truth of the matter. So too for morality.
>You cannot scientifically demonstrate that slavery is wrong though.
Maybe so, but I don't think scientific demonstrability is a necessary condition for something to be objectively true.
> Sure, my point wasn't that the yuckiness of spinach and the purpose of life were equally important issues, but that on the view that oughts are simply matters of opinion, that my rejections of the claims "spinach is yucky" and "our purpose is to reproduce" are equally valid---I've simply disagreed with an opinion of yours. This is very different from me rejecting a claim like "The earth is round". And I think, with claims like the latter, it makes sense for a rational discussion to be had about whether or not such a claim is right. But with claims like "spinach is yucky", there's surely nothing to be discussed---I like spinach and you don't, end of story.
If you don't like spinach, I think it would be counterproductive to tell you that you do in fact like it or that you are wrong not to like spinach. I still think you are capable of liking it, so people could offer you suggestions as to how you can make it better. Feeling a meaning in life is exactly like that; you can't tell a depressed person that they're wrong. I think it's healthy for them to have a chance to express themselves though.
> But I think you sense that the purpose of life isn't this kind of claim; otherwise it wouldn't make sense to try to rationally discuss this claim.
I can't see how it's not perfectly fine to rationally discuss subjective claims; there is philosophy of art, for starters. Just because I think morals are subjective, doesn't mean I don't see the value in having compatible values or at least an understanding of why differences exist. If you look up 'ethical expressivism', it might make more sense.
> Maybe that an unconscious reproductive drive undergirds the desire to engage in such activities even if they are not immediately related to reproduction directly? OK - maybe so, but if all of human behavior is undergirded by a reproductive drive, "our clear purpose is to reproduce" doesn't actually tell us anything about what to do, since anything that we do would be distantly related to a reproductive drive, and we're back to square one.
You mentioned detachment from life, and I think curiosity is what makes us humans stand out. I think what we need for fulfilment is so simple that it's so hard for people full of curiosity to accept it. That's why I agree with the idea that a rigorous approach to truth (including truth you don't like) will bring you back to what matters.
You have an intuition that reproduction is far too simple a story. I think at the core all humans have some values hardwired, but we can't exist on that level because culture has become far too complicated. We can't reproduce without cultural sophistication, because societies are too big to not require cultural sophistication. Also, I think you're still partially mixing up short-term and long-term fulfilment. Drugs can make you feel really fulfilled short-term too. Dare I say it, activities that don't feed back to what matters are probably escapist and may even be parasitical. Societies are in trouble when they have a hard time drawing the line between what is constructive and what is parasitical.
> (Of course, that's all putting aside that that all says nothing about what our true, objective purpose really is.)
I can't see how 'objective purpose' is not an oxymoron. A hacker is someone who dismisses the notion of an objective purpose in a tool and repurposes it as they will. Purpose is always subject to a being's existence. You have an intuition behind the word 'purpose' that I do not seem to have, as if purposes can exist without any beings. Do you really believe that morals can exist without any beings?
> These things don't make beliefs about the shape of the earth or the relationship between the earth and the sun fashions in the sense that there's no truth of the matter. So too for morality.
You think morality is progressive like science/knowledge. I would say morality only seems to progress because it reflects science/knowledge. Morality is rooted in emotion. You can reason about it all you like, but there is a reason why the police carry guns around. Ultimately force is the decider of morality in modern society. People who do destructive things see them as being right. Even self-destructive things are seen as being right by those who commit them. You can think in terms of human rights, but the reality of morality is realpolitik. As far as I see it, we humans have failed for thousands of years to do what you seem to think we do.
Do you agree with every single word of the bill of human rights? Or do you see that it is also subject to interpretation?
> Maybe so, but I don't think scientific demonstrability is a necessary condition for something to be objectively true.
Sure I can see why you might think a priori truths are objectively true, but I don't think you can prove slavery is wrong a priori, because the premises will always require experience to accept them. You'll only be preaching to the choir, so to speak. Also, as I've previously stated, words like 'slave' vary a lot culturally, so I'm not sure you could even settle on a definition that people generally agree upon, setting aside the fact that you have to make the definition not too broad or too narrow.
Anyway, I still can't grasp what you mean by the word 'purpose'. It seems logocentric to me. I genuinely don't have the same intuition. I think the difference lies there, and so I don't think we're going to make sense of the differences with words. I understand how people could have a sense for moral realism, and I think some dogma is necessary for culture, so although we don't agree, I don't think it matters all that much.
>I can't see how it's not perfectly fine to rationally discuss subjective claims
You're correct, I was thinking that in defending reproduction being our purpose that you were claiming that this is true and that people who deny this are wrong to do so---but certainly, we can make objective claims about subjective beliefs.
>You mentioned detachment from life, and I think curiosity is what makes us humans stand out. I think what we need for fulfilment is so simple that it's so hard for people full of curiosity to accept it. That's why I agree with the idea that a rigorous approach to truth (including truth you don't like) will bring you back to what matters.
So my point about the rigorous approach to truth is that (insofar as this is something that the existentialists don't do) it's not feasible to bootstrap yourself Cartesian-style from "I think, therefore I am" all the way to normal, everyday truths---but I think this is OK; we should instead embrace a level of uncertainty in our beliefs, and this shouldn't prevent us from acting---there comes a time when we have to step out of the shade of analyzing things rigorously and out into the sunlight of actually doing things in the real world. I suspect you'd largely agree with this.
>You have an intuition that reproduction is far too simple a story.
So, construed as just a psychological fact about what people find meaningful, I think either it's simply not the correct story with a strict interpretation or it's just not a very meaningful story with a loose interpretation. People find meanings in things that aren't reproduction, which is why I say the strict interpretation can't be correct, but if we interpret actions being motivated by reproductive drives so loosely that all kinds of things get categorized as being motivated by a reproductive drive, then I don't see that this story is really telling us anything. Like, there's the famous strawman caricature of Adlerian psychoanalysis, that the psychoanalyst looks at a person who jumps into a lake to save a drowning child and says, "Clearly, this person was motivated by feelings of inferiority to save that child---his behavior was compensation!", and then looks at a person who doesn't jump into a lake to save a drowning child and says, "Clearly, this person was motivated by feelings of inferiority to not save that child---he felt too inferior to do so!" Like, this person hasn't really told us anything meaningful, no matter what happens, he's quick to explain it away through feelings of inferiority. Maybe it's true, maybe it's not (this analogy isn't for me to dispute evolution or evolutionary drives, don't misunderstand me)---it hasn't really told us anything about what actually happens. And I see this as the situation with characterizing all activities people find meaningful as being motivated by a reproductive drive, if that makes sense.
>I can't see how 'objective purpose' is not an oxymoron. A hacker is someone who dismisses the notion of an objective purpose in a tool and repurposes it as they will.
I would normally say that there is a kind of objective purpose in a tool. For example, a hammer. When I talk about the objective purpose of a hammer, I'm talking about the hammer's utility qua hammer---so whether it's hard enough for nails to get driven in when hit, whether the handle is long enough for someone to grasp it, etc. A bad hammer might be one that's made out of sponge or something, so it doesn't actually move any nails. It can be repurposed to be, for example, a paperweight, and maybe do an ok job at doing that. But it's failed to fulfill its purpose as a hammer. And I think there's an analogical sense in which humans can be good qua human. I would talk about a summum bonom, a highest good, under which various virtuous activities fall under.
It's interesting that you bring up hackers. I think repurposing tools to do what they're not meant to do is generally seen as a hack. And in an engineering context, this is generally seen as a bad thing in the long-term, or at least an indicator something's not right---tools should get used for the purpose for which they were designed, at least, in the long-term. (That's not to say anything bad about hackers; I love the idea of a hacker.)
>Purpose is always subject to a being's existence. You have an intuition behind the word 'purpose' that I do not seem to have, as if purposes can exist without any beings. Do you really believe that morals can exist without any beings?
I suppose not, but I also think there can't be any physical facts if there aren't any physical things. But I don't think this means physical facts aren't objectively true; likewise, I still think moral facts are objectively true.
>Do you agree with every single word of the bill of human rights? Or do you see that it is also subject to interpretation?
I see that it's subject to interpretation, yes, because I don't think that any moral truths are grounded in the bill of rights anymore than truths about Newtonian physics are grounded in Newton's Principia. What we think and say about truths is distinct from the existence of truths themselves.
>You think morality is progressive like science/knowledge.
Well, to be sure, there's a distinction between moral epistemology and moral ontology. What I was saying there is that I can be mistaken about moral truths---perhaps even humanity as a whole can be mistaken about moral truths, and they might even regress morally at times, and yet, the fact of the matter about morality doesn't change. This is because our beliefs about morals do not themselves determine what morals are, just like our beliefs about science do not themselves determine what scientific facts are---if humanity were to suddenly regress and start thinking the Earth was flat again, that wouldn't change the roundness of the Earth.
>I don't think you can prove slavery is wrong a priori, because the premises will always require experience to accept them.
Well, I think that we have a strong intuition that it is morally impermissible to deprive one of certain rights, and from that, it logically follows that slavery (in the relevant sense---I think you know what I'm talking about) is immoral.
>You'll only be preaching to the choir, so to speak.
I mean, maybe so - in the same sense that I might be preaching to the choir when I talk about the existence of physical things. Like, maybe I tell you about the chair I'm sitting on, and you say, "Well, I see the chair you're sitting on, and I can touch it, but I don't share the intuition that that means that the chair exists physically." And if you say that, there's nothing more I can really say to you---that's just an intuition you don't share. But of course, I still believe that the chair really is there.
>Anyway, I still can't grasp what you mean by the word 'purpose'. It seems logocentric to me. I genuinely don't have the same intuition. I think the difference lies there, and so I don't think we're going to make sense of the differences with words. I understand how people could have a sense for moral realism, and I think some dogma is necessary for culture, so although we don't agree, I don't think it matters all that much.
I suspect we won't come to an agreement here either---though I do kind of suspect that you do share the same intuition. I certainly don't think you act as if morals are subjective. Like, I suspect that if you came across a culture in which people randomly chose a child every day to kill for no particular reason, you wouldn't think, "Well, that's just their culture---I find it distasteful, but if they believe it's morally right to do this, then I guess it is morally right for them." What I'm basically saying is that we have strong intuitions that morals are true independently of what people think, and that objections like "people disagree about morals" or "people have changed their stances on morals" aren't objections to my intuitions any more than "people disagree about scientific facts" or "people have changed their stances on scientific facts" are objections to science. It is true that the manner in which moral truths exist are strange---it's not like you can go out and touch them. But I also think the same is true for, for example, numbers---I would say that numbers exist, even though we can't go out and touch them. Not that numbers and moral truths exist in the same sense---just providing some intuition.
> I was thinking that in defending reproduction being our purpose that you were claiming that this is true and that people who deny this are wrong to do so---but certainly, we can make objective claims about subjective beliefs.
Yes, I don't think you're wrong for disagreeing with me.
> ... it's not feasible to bootstrap yourself Cartesian-style from "I think, therefore I am" all the way to normal, everyday truths...
Yes, I also think it's impossible to build from the bottom up like that for anything value-dependent.
>
I know what I am saying is unfalsifiable. I have no problems with that. I don't think purpose/motivation can ever really be falsified. You're still looking to purpose as a guiding principle, rather than a subjective description of what your mind is already doing. I think we look for meaning because it is already defined within us. We can't choose meaning; we can only choose to act, and then we justify our own actions. (I don't think any of that is falsifiable either.)
> I would normally say that there is a kind of objective purpose in a tool. For example, a hammer. When I talk about the objective purpose of a hammer, I'm talking about the hammer's utility qua hammer---so whether it's hard enough for nails to get driven in when hit, whether the handle is long enough for someone to grasp it, etc. A bad hammer might be one that's made out of sponge or something, so it doesn't actually move any nails. It can be repurposed to be, for example, a paperweight, and maybe do an ok job at doing that. But it's failed to fulfill its purpose as a hammer. And I think there's an analogical sense in which humans can be good qua human. I would talk about a summum bonom, a highest good, under which various virtuous activities fall under.
You're talking about language. A monkey that picks up a rock to crack open a nut is using a hammer of sorts. There is no ideal hammer; there is only an intersubjective understanding of a hammer which we might assume is ideal.
> It's interesting that you bring up hackers. I think repurposing tools to do what they're not meant to do is generally seen as a hack. And in an engineering context, this is generally seen as a bad thing in the long-term, or at least an indicator something's not right---tools should get used for the purpose for which they were designed, at least, in the long-term. (That's not to say anything bad about hackers; I love the idea of a hacker.)
Useful hacks get relabeled. The rock could be a paperweight, a hammer, a weapon etc. even if it is explicitly labeled as only one of those things. Purpose is not in the tool itself, nor is it in language; it is in our conception, based on experience and the knowledge we accept, just like morality.
> I suppose not, but I also think there can't be any physical facts if there aren't any physical things. But I don't think this means physical facts aren't objectively true; likewise, I still think moral facts are objectively true.
So a universe could exist without morals if there were no moral agents in it. That means morality is contingent on moral agents existing. Your argument is that beings would eventually end up with the same morals every time, but I don't think so.
If we met a sentient carnivorous species, we should expect its morality to be quite different to a sentient herbivorous species'. I think a carnivore would always construct a moral view that eating animals is right (or its existence would be morally wrong). A sentient herbivore would most likely come to the conclusion that carnivorism is morally wrong and all those carnivorous animals should be exterminated. A sentient parasite would most likely come to the conclusion that parasitism is morally right (that a form of slavery is morally right). Could nature itself be morally wrong for creating those things?
> I don't think that any moral truths are grounded in the bill of rights anymore than truths about Newtonian physics are grounded in Newton's Principia. What we think and say about truths is distinct from the existence of truths themselves.
> Well, I think that we have a strong intuition that it is morally impermissible to deprive one of certain rights, and from that, it logically follows that slavery (in the relevant sense---I think you know what I'm talking about) is immoral.
Okay, so you are a moral fallibilist after all; you are open to the possibility that your moral beliefs are wrong. I think our views are somewhat compatible, since we both see that we are relying on intuition, rather than something testable.
> This is because our beliefs about morals do not themselves determine what morals are, just like our beliefs about science do not themselves determine what scientific facts are---if humanity were to suddenly regress and start thinking the Earth was flat again, that wouldn't change the roundness of the Earth.
> ... when I talk about the existence of physical things. Like, maybe I tell you about the chair I'm sitting on, and you say, "Well, I see the chair you're sitting on, and I can touch it, but I don't share the intuition that that means that the chair exists physically." And if you say that, there's nothing more I can really say to you---that's just an intuition you don't share. But of course, I still believe that the chair really is there.
Language itself is learnable because of the shared basis in the senses. Morals are way more abstract than the chair existing, and even whether the world is round or not. Our experience of physical properties is more or less going to be the same, even with conditions such as blindness etc., since sight, hearing and touch all construct a model of the world that coheres. That is not the case for morality, which starts with something like a sense of pain and jumps to cultural abstractions which we inherit.
> I suspect we won't come to an agreement here either---though I do kind of suspect that you do share the same intuition. I certainly don't think you act as if morals are subjective. Like, I suspect that if you came across a culture in which people randomly chose a child every day to kill for no particular reason, you wouldn't think, "Well, that's just their culture---I find it distasteful, but if they believe it's morally right to do this, then I guess it is morally right for them."
Just because I think morals are subjective, doesn't mean I think anything goes. They are still subject to my own sense of what is sustainable long-term. I understand how they think that what they could be doing is justifiable.
If you wander into anthropology, you will see people who take a stance like what you describe: that one culture cannot morally judge another. I can sort of see where they are coming from: tribes exist because they maintain a set of shared practices. If the tribe goes out of existence, their practices failed them. Their long-term existence means their shared practices have utility. I'm well aware of the immediate problem that it requires time to see the consequences; that's why I think shared knowledge (especially of what doesn't work) is vital.
> What I'm basically saying is that we have strong intuitions that morals are true independently of what people think, and that objections like "people disagree about morals" or "people have changed their stances on morals" aren't objections to my intuitions any more than "people disagree about scientific facts" or "people have changed their stances on scientific facts" are objections to science.
Yes, and a sentient parasite would probably tell us that parasitism seems morally right independent of what people think.
> It is true that the manner in which moral truths exist are strange---it's not like you can go out and touch them. But I also think the same is true for, for example, numbers---I would say that numbers exist, even though we can't go out and touch them. Not that numbers and moral truths exist in the same sense---just providing some intuition.
I don't think morals can be true just like I don't think numbers can be true.
Sure. But I'm not denying the reality of instinct. What I'm denying is that instinct is normative. What is natural is not necessarily what is good or what we ought to do.
>You keep bringing up words and facts. Reality is more than words.
Sure. This "what should I do today" story isn't some linguistic sleight of hand. I told that story to evoke the intuition that there's a difference between instincts and values.
It's really just that the claim that reproduction is our purpose appears unfounded. The argument seems to be something like:
P1: The process of evolution has sculpted human biology for reproduction. P2: If human biology has been sculpted for reproduction, then we ought to reproduce. C: We ought to reproduce.
P2 is simply unfounded - it just doesn't appear to be true. Perhaps what you're saying is something like "You're just playing a word game here. Saying that we are sculpted to reproduce is the same as saying that we ought to reproduce---these phrases have the same meaning." But these phrases don't have the same meaning. There are facts, and then there are values, and these aren't the same thing---not just linguistically, they really, in reality, are not the same thing.
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And suppose they are the same thing. So our purpose is to reproduce. Does this even mean anything in practice? I take it you believe your purpose is to reproduce. Why is it that you've typed text into a combox and hit "reply"? That doesn't seem conducive to reproduction. It's not just this comment; I suspect that many things, if not the majority of things you do, don't seem conducive to optimizing reproduction. Why would you do these things if they're not helping your purpose?
Perhaps you'd say that "Well, it might not immediately seem like these things are conducive to reproduction, but there's a long story I can tell about how these actually are related to my reproductive drive." But if you start playing these kinds of games, it isn't clear that "our purpose is to reproduce" really means anything in practice at all. You can always construct some story about how your behavior is, through some long chain of reasoning, reducible to a reproductive drive. That still leaves us with the practical question of what our purpose is - what should we actually do? "To reproduce" just isn't helpful.